On August 28, 2025, the "Grandwin Trade & Business Roundtable(Session VII)" was successfully held. This session focused on the "U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Framework Agreement." It was moderated by Professor Yang Guohua from Tsinghua University Law School, with Mr. Jiang Feng'an from the School of Comparative Law at China University of Political Science and Law serving as the keynote speaker. Mr. Ye Bin from the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Mr. Hu Jianguo from Nankai University Law School participated as discussants for an in-depth dialogue.

I. Keynote Analysis: The Four Dimensions of the U.S.-EU Agreement

Mr. Jiang Feng'an provided a systematic analysis of the U.S.-EU agreement from the perspective of EU law. The agreement primarily covers four areas: tariff measures, non-tariff measures, procurement and investment in the U.S., and cooperation targeting third countries.

•  Regarding Tariff Measures: Mr. Jiang traced the U.S.-EU trade war beginning on February 10 and briefly summarized the outcome within the framework agreement. The U.S. utilized three tariff instruments during the trade war. The EU consistently countered U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum, yet these tariffs were not eliminated in the framework agreement; it was merely stated that negotiations would continue. Additionally, while the EU opposed U.S. reciprocal tariffs and tariffs on automobiles and auto parts at the WTO level, the framework agreement ultimately capped these tariffs at 15% and granted exemptions for certain EU products.

  
  

• Regarding Non-Tariff Measures: The EU resisted pressure to include specific digital regulatory rules like the Digital Services Act in the document. Instead, it employed more general and ambiguous language, leaving significant room for interpretation.

  
  

• Regarding Procurement and Investment in the U.S.: The EU committed to procuring U.S. products and making substantial investments in the United States. However, as the EU is a market economy, although the European Commission claims no power to compel private enterprises to procure from or invest in the U.S., the framework agreement retains these commitments and adds provisions for procurement of AI chips. Mr. Jiang raised a question here: How will the EU guide its enterprises to procure from and invest in the U.S.? In response, Mr. Liao Shiping suggested the EU could fulfill these commitments vaguely. The level of rule of law encompasses not only how laws are implemented but also how they might be circumvented.

  
  

• Regarding Cooperation Targeting Third Countries (especially China): This is mainly reflected in Articles 5, 13-16, and 19 of the agreement, covering areas such as cybersecurity, critical minerals, intellectual property protection and enforcement, and labor rights.

II. Dialogue Session: Multi-perspective Expert Interpretations and Recommendations

(I) Mr. Jiang Feng'an and Mr. Ye Bin: The EU's Rule-of-Law Logic and China's Response

Mr. Jiang further proposed China's response logic to the U.S.-EU agreement. First, the EU will not openly depart from its "rule-of-law logic," meaning it will not completely follow U.S. rules but will persist in supporting rules-based trade. Based on this premise, first, U.S.-EU cooperation targeting China will also not deviate from this "rule-of-law logic." Second, a "power logic" approach could be adopted towards the U.S. depending on the circumstances. Third, a "rule-of-law logic" approach can be employed towards the EU, which also requires deepening systematic research on EU laws and rules, particularly understanding and skillfully utilizing the EU's exclusive competencies in areas like trade and investment. Fourth, he suggested engaging in cooperation with the EU. This could not only foster a mutually beneficial relationship in digital governance but also showcase China's image as a responsible major power to the international community, while countering negative U.S. narratives in global discourse and rule-making.

Mr. Ye Bin first affirmed Mr. Jiang's observations on the U.S.-EU agreement from the EU law perspective, emphasizing the importance of the rule-of-law logic, but also suggested the need to further observe the EU's adherence to the rule of law during the process of the joint statement negotiations. Secondly, Mr. Ye pointed out legal conflicts between the text of the U.S.-EU agreement and the EU's interpretation of it, suggesting the EU might bypass the European Parliament and utilize the Comitology procedure within the European Commission, potentially undermining internal democratic rule of law to some extent.

 Thirdly, from a WTO law perspective, it is difficult for China to "free-ride" and benefit; the EU might more frequently initiate anti-dumping, countervailing, Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), International Procurement Instrument (IPI) measures against China as a hedge. Additionally, the agreement did not address some of Trump's concerns, such as automobile standards and non-tariff barriers, indicating potential instability in the agreement. Furthermore, Mr. Ye also believed the cooperation targeting third countries within the agreement warrants China's attention. Finally, Mr. Ye noted that the U.S.-EU agreement significantly damages the EU's reputation for leadership in international trade rules and might, similar to the TTIP in the past, spark public opposition within Europe.

(II) Mr. Hu Jianguo: The U.S.-EU Agreement and Response from a WTO Perspective

Mr. Hu Jianguo primarily analyzed the U.S.-EU agreement and its implications from a WTO angle, discussing its impact on the global economy and trade order, and proposing response strategies for China.

Regarding the relationship between the U.S. and the WTO, Mr. Hu believed that in the areas of services trade and intellectual property, the U.S. still wishes to remain within the WTO legal framework. However, in goods trade, the U.S. has effectively deviated from WTO rules, as it has concluded bilateral trade agreements, including tariff deals, with an increasing number of trade partners. Under U.S. leadership, a "Turnberry system" might be gradually forming. This system is advanced through "Trump Round" negotiations—negotiations under U.S. coercion—and is characterized by a U.S.-centric, non-reciprocal, unfair structure; instability and uncertainty; and targeting of China, among others. Mr. Hu mentioned that this U.S.-EU agreement contains numerous clauses targeting China, such as poison pill and transshipment clauses, which could have significant impacts. The EU's current attitude and future direction require continued observation, particularly regarding whether it will continue supporting WTO rules or shift towards a power logic.

Regarding China's response strategies, Mr. Hu suggested China should continue adhering to the rule-of-law logic, resolving disputes through WTO mechanisms, while abandoning illusions about a U.S. return to the fold. He also proposed considering cooperation with other WTO members to jointly uphold the multilateral trading system. Finally, Mr. Hu emphasized that Chinese scholars must actively voice their opinions, export Chinese perspectives and propositions, and safeguard the WTO multilateral trading system.

(III) Mr. Yang Guohua: The EU's Rule-of-Law Logic and Realistic Considerations

Mr. Yang Guohua highly commended the views of the experts, metaphorically likening the EU to a carnivore for which the rule of law is its source of nourishment. He questioned whether the EU might compromise its rule-of-law logic due to realist considerations and asked Mr. Jiang Feng'an for his perspective.

Mr. Jiang Feng'an responded that, first, the EU indeed has a bottom line regarding the rule of law, but conflicts of interest among its member states and varying degrees of external dependence lead to complex decision-making processes. Secondly, although the EU sometimes compromises in reality, it always seeks a moral high ground and uses the packaging of the rule of law to conceal its protectionist tendencies. Mr. Jiang explained the EU's decision-making process, pointing out that it involves intertwined interests of member state governments, the European Parliament, lobbying groups, and environmental organizations. Finally, Mr. Jiang believed that the current significant opposition to the U.S.-EU agreement within the EU presents a good opportunity for more constructive cooperation with the EU.

Mr. Yang Guohua expressed agreement and discussed idealism and realism in diplomacy. Diplomatic behavior is often mixed and cannot be explained by pure idealism or realism.

III. Discussion Session: Digital Trade Rules and Future Contests

During the discussion session, Yan Shaohua raised questions regarding the digital trade rules in the agreement, asking the experts for their views on the prospects for future U.S.-EU contestation over digital rules and how Trump's power logic and the EU's rule-of-law logic would play out on digital regulatory issues.

Mr. Ye Bin responded to the questions. The main points included the following: First, regarding the EU's attitude and reaction to the U.S.-EU agreement, he noted significant anti-American sentiment within the EU. Similar to during the TTIP negotiations, there was substantial anti-American sentiment on both sides, with deep public concern over the negotiation topics. This sentiment might resurface with the U.S.-EU agreement, especially concerning tariffs or other trade issues. Secondly, Mr. Ye pointed out that the EU did not strictly adhere to its professed rule-of-law principles in this agreement, opting more for a de-legalized political agreement approach. Second, regarding the specific content and impact of the agreement, Mr. Ye noted that several key issues were not covered, such as services liberalization, public procurement markets, and data flows. He suggested that perhaps this omission allowed the agreement to avoid strong public opposition. Furthermore, the agreement demonstrates Trump's negotiation tactics; now that the EU has yielded on tariffs, it might be forced to make more concessions on regulatory issues in the future. Mr. Ye indicated there would be more contestation between the U.S. and EU in areas like digital regulation. Third, on the issue of the EU's rule-of-law logic versus realism, Mr. Ye believed the EU has always sought a balance between idealism and realism, but realism might prevail when facing strong U.S. pressure. Nonetheless, the EU would strive to minimize illegality and uphold its rule-of-law ideals as much as possible. Finally, Mr. Ye suggested that observing how the EU seeks legitimacy within the framework of WTO law and its own EU law could help in learning and understanding the EU's behavioral logic.

IV. Summary and Outlook: Understanding the EU, Deepening Cooperation, and Active Response

Finally, Mr. Jiang Feng'an summarized the seminar. The experts conducted profound analysis and discussion around the U.S.-EU agreement, which was thought-provoking. The EU's rule-of-law logic is the foundation of its existence; even under realistic pressure, the EU will try to uphold its rule-of-law principles. China should understand the EU's rule-of-law logic, seek common ground in cooperation with the EU, and utilize this logic for communication and collaboration. Future efforts should advance research on the traditions and systems of EU law. Understanding the EU's rule-of-law logic will help better address future international trade challenges. Simultaneously, continued attention should be paid to the internal EU reactions and subsequent developments regarding the U.S.-EU agreement, particularly the stance of the European Parliament and potential legislative processes.