On the afternoon of June 7, 2025, the "Grandwin Trade & Business Roundtable(Session VI)" was successfully held. This session focused on the cutting-edge topic of the "WTO Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA)," specifically inviting Professor Yang Guohua from Tsinghua University—one of the first and a reappointed MPIA arbitrator—as the keynote speaker, and Professor Liu Ying from Sun Yat-sen University School of Law as the discussant. The event was moderated by Lawyer Guan Jian, Director of Grandwin Law Firm.

Keynote Speech by Professor Yang Guohua

(I) Introduction to the Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement

Professor Yang began with a brief introduction to the MPIA. Established as an arbitration arrangement under Article 25 of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the MPIA was spearheaded by members including the EU and China against the backdrop of the long-term inability of the WTO Appellate Body to hear cases and the continuous US obstruction of member appointments. Since its establishment in 2020, the mechanism has gradually developed a complete set of rules, an arbitrator system, and case-handling procedures, aiming to maintain the predictability and binding force of multilateral trade rules amidst the current "dysfunction" of the dispute settlement system. Professor Yang emphasized that although the MPIA is a temporary institutional design, its arrangements possess a high degree of legitimacy, flexibility, and urgency, making it one of the most effective institutional innovations in current WTO practice.

(II) Internal Observations on the Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement

As one of the first and a reappointed arbitrator, Professor Yang provided a detailed internal perspective on the MPIA's operations and its arbitrators.

Professor Yang shared unique insights from his five-year tenure as an MPIA arbitrator. He introduced the professional backgrounds, geographical representation, and practical experience in international trade of the first ten MPIA arbitrators, highlighting the professionalism and representativeness reflected in their selection. Professor Yang noted that the MPIA operates with a non-remunerated, voluntary service arbitrator system. Over five years, 73 plenary meetings of arbitrators were held, fully demonstrating the group's high sense of responsibility and professionalism. Professor Yang particularly pointed out that "institutions are made of people." The key to the MPIA's ability to ensure the quality of its rulings lies in the long-term, stable communication mechanisms and deep professional trust among the arbitrators. Additionally, he briefly introduced the professional backgrounds of the four newly appointed arbitrators.

In his lecture, Professor Yang focused on introducing his colleagues—the first group of MPIA arbitrators he worked with for five years—and elaborated in detail on their professional backgrounds and working styles based on his personal observations. He noted that these ten arbitrators come from different regions worldwide, with diverse legal system backgrounds. Not only do they have profound expertise in fields like international economic law and public international law, but many have also held significant positions in the WTO Secretariat, the GATT negotiation system, or permanent missions of various countries, possessing rich practical experience and institutional understanding. Building on this, Professor Yang introduced the four new arbitrators appointed after the rotation on June 2, 2025: Ichiro Araki (Japan, former WTO Secretariat staff), Ana T. Caetano (Brazil, long-time legal advisor to the government as a lawyer, with extensive dispute settlement experience), Esteban B. Conejos Jr. (Philippines, former WTO Permanent Representative), and Paul Richard O’Connor (Australia, served as a panelist in 18 WTO cases, with extensive case-handling experience). He pointed out that although some members have not yet met formally, their CVs indicate equally high levels of professionalism and expertise in international law.

Professor Yang also systematically introduced the three cases handled by the MPIA to date, noting that the mechanism adheres to the 90-day time limit, maintains restrained reasoning in its rulings, and strives for consistency with existing Appellate Body rulings as much as possible, demonstrating the mechanism's procedural advantages.

Professor Yang emphasized the unique role of the MPIA in the current WTO dispute settlement system. He pointed out that the MPIA not only provides a "safety net" for the multilateral trade dispute settlement mechanism but also demonstrates high flexibility and adaptability in practice, even possessing advantages in procedural efficiency, party autonomy, and time limit control that the Appellate Body partially lacked. Professor Yang further stated that even if the WTO Appellate Body is restored in the future, the MPIA could still rely on the legal basis provided by DSU Article 25 to serve as another legitimate and optional alternative dispute settlement path for members outside the formal appeal process. Simultaneously, he suggested that some of the MPIA's institutional designs and practical experience could provide valuable directions and paradigms for future WTO reform.

Comments by Professor Liu Ying

Professor Liu highly praised the significant institutional and practical value of the MPIA mechanism in the context of the current dysfunction of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. She noted that the MPIA, as an arbitration mechanism based on DSU Article 25, possesses full legal legitimacy and procedural safeguards. Its operation not only demonstrates the collective political will of members to uphold multilateral trade rules but also reflects a commitment to the value of legalism.

(I) The Legitimacy Basis and Functional Positioning of the MPIA

Professor Liu stated that although the MPIA is an interim arrangement, it is not merely an "institutional expediency." Its establishment has a solid treaty basis (DSU Article 25), and its clear procedural arrangements and arbitration rules fill the procedural gap left by the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body. It not only safeguards members' right to appeal but also reinforces the enforceability of panel reports, essentially reconstructing the "second-instance mechanism" of dispute settlement in terms of institutional function.

(II) The Significance of the MPIA for WTO Reform

Professor Liu pointed out that the MPIA's design addresses, to some extent, criticisms of the Appellate Body by the US and other members, including strict adherence to the 90-day time limit; more restrained drafting of rulings, avoiding overbroad interpretations; emphasis on party autonomy, allowing for flexible procedural adjustments; and clear limitations on arbitrators handling "unnecessary legal issues" and "ultra vires interpretations."

Professor Liu noted that although the number of MPIA cases is currently limited, it shows gradually accumulating institutional influence. She particularly emphasized the need to understand the MPIA's significance from a "long-termism" perspective: it is not only a tool to maintain institutional confidence in the short term but may also become a "spare track" for the future structural reconstruction of the dispute settlement mechanism, and could even continue to exist as a legitimate alternative mechanism based on Article 25 after the Appellate Body's restoration. She also pointed out that the MPIA's experience is expected to promote the formation of more "single-instance final arbitration" dispute settlement solutions, providing inspiration for the future development of diversified dispute settlement paths within the WTO.

Q&A Session

Question 1: The number of countries participating in the MPIA is limited, currently only one-third of WTO members. Can this mechanism have a substantive impact on the global multilateral trading system?

Professor Liu pointed out that the MPIA's influence should not be judged solely by the number of participating members; one should also consider the role its participants play in the global dispute settlement system. The institutional commitment of MPIA participants helps maintain the continuity and stability of multilateral rules. The MPIA plays a dual role as both an "institutional safety net" and a "signal stabilizer" in the current context of the paralyzed WTO Appellate Body.

The MPIA mechanism constitutes the current "minimum multilateral consensus," preventing a potential systemic collapse that could result from the paralysis of the WTO appeal mechanism. Although the membership is limited in size, as Professor Yang mentioned, its greater significance lies in providing a platform for disputing parties that are "willing to accept constraints," making it the most feasible and legitimate continuation of the multilateral dispute settlement system in its current form.

Professor Yang pointed out, firstly, that while MPIA members are not a majority in number, they are highly representative in structure, covering many core members with practical dispute settlement experience and participation capacity (such as the EU, China, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, etc.). These members represent the main "producers" and "users" of WTO rules.

Furthermore, the MPIA thus serves as a "safety net" for the global multilateral trade dispute settlement mechanism at a practical level, maintaining the continuity of the appeal process. The very existence of the institution holds significant symbolic meaning, reflecting the continued commitment and institutional responsibility of some members to the WTO rules-based system.

Most importantly, the MPIA actually undertakes deeper institutional functions in the current context of the "Appellate Body paralysis." Professor Yang noted that the MPIA helps address the issue of "appeal into the void," where appeals to the non-existent Appellate Body render rulings ineffective. Additionally, the establishment of the MPIA has a "chilling effect," making members more inclined to comply with WTO rules. Finally, the MPIA also helps test whether members truly have the willingness to resolve disputes through WTO rules.

Question 2: How are MPIA arbitrators selected?

Professor Yang explained that MPIA arbitrator selection is similar to the WTO's process, involving member nomination, professional screening, and interview assessment. First, MPIA participating members nominate candidates based on their own judgment. After nominations are complete, all MPIA members interview the candidates, and appointments are made following consensus agreement by all MPIA members.

Question 3: Some members, like Turkey, have not formally joined the MPIA but "selectively apply" the mechanism in specific disputes. Does this weaken the MPIA's institutional stability?

Professor Yang acknowledged that some members (like Turkey) have not formally joined the MPIA mechanism with a declaration but, in specific disputes and through mutual agreement with the other party, opt to apply the MPIA arbitration procedure selectively.

He believed that while formally this approach raises concerns about "free-riding" or "asymmetry in institutional commitment," in terms of substantive effect, such "case-by-case application" objectively expands the MPIA's scope of use and enhances its visibility and influence in WTO dispute settlement practice. More importantly, this flexibility in application helps lower the psychological barrier for some members to formally join, creating conditions for incorporating more members and promoting the mechanism's normalization in the future.

Furthermore, from a legal perspective, Turkey and the EU resolving disputes through arbitration based on mutual consent is entirely in line with the provisions of DSU Article 25.

Therefore, Professor Yang emphasized the need to view this "selective application" phenomenon dialectically: on one hand, encouraging more members to join formally to enhance the system's predictability and stability; on the other hand, acknowledging the role such flexible arbitration methods themselves play in alleviating deadlocks, and recognizing that this approach provides experience for the overall reform of the WTO appeal mechanism.

Question 4: Will the MPIA mechanism become permanent? If the WTO Appellate Body is restored, what will its role be?

Professor Yang stated that although the MPIA was established as a "temporary arrangement," its institutional legitimacy is based on DSU Article 25, providing a stable legal foundation. Moreover, its normative operation and procedural advantages give it a certain institutional vitality; it may not naturally disappear with the restoration of the Appellate Body. He pointed out that the legal legitimacy basis granted by DSU Article 25 means that even after the Appellate Body's restoration, the MPIA could still serve as an "alternative dispute settlement mechanism" voluntarily chosen by members.

He also noted that the MPIA has demonstrated some characteristics superior to the traditional Appellate Body in practice, such as more streamlined procedures, controllable arbitration timelines, and more restrained legal interpretations by arbitrators. These could allow it to exist in the future as a "supplementary mechanism" within the WTO dispute settlement system. The successful experience of the MPIA might provide institutional inspiration for WTO reform, such as introducing more flexible arbitration options in future DSU amendments.

Professor Liu stated that the MPIA mechanism has the potential to transcend being a mere "transitional tool." She emphasized that although the MPIA is structurally designed as a temporary arrangement, based on its current operational effectiveness and feedback from participating countries, it is becoming a stable anchor for the rules community to maintain dispute settlement functions. Even if the Appellate Body restarts in the future, members might still proactively choose the MPIA as a path for resolving specific cases due to efficiency and cooperative willingness.

She further pointed out that the MPIA mechanism is also shaping a new dispute settlement mindset: more flexible, emphasizing procedural consultation among members, and stressing the enforceability and acceptability of final rulings. This has forward-looking significance for WTO reform and is worth preserving and drawing upon during institutional reconstruction.

Question 5: Besides the MPIA, are there other possible alternative mechanisms? Could the US potentially promote the construction of a similar mechanism?

Professor Yang mentioned that a former WTO Deputy Director-General once stated: whether through the MPIA mechanism or other arbitration arrangements agreed upon among members, as long as they comply with WTO rules, especially the DSU, they are welcome institutional practices. Therefore, even if the US currently criticizes the Appellate Body and the MPIA, it could very well construct a dispute settlement mechanism it deems more reasonable and aligned with its own interests, for example, leading the establishment of an alternative procedure that "complies with DSU rules but does not rely on existing mechanisms."

Professor Yang emphasized that the real crucial issue is not the form of the mechanism, but whether members sincerely fulfill their obligations to resolve disputes and avoid strategies like "appeal into the void" to evade responsibility. Therefore, regardless of the mechanism's name, as long as the purpose is to substantially resolve disputes and promote the functioning of rules, it should be welcomed as an institutional supplement.

Conclusion

After the Q&A session, Professor Yang expressed his sincere gratitude to all participants for their active engagement and interest, and looked forward to continued in-depth exchanges on the development and reform of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in the future.

On behalf of the participants, Lawyer Guan Jian thanked Professor Yang and Professor Liu for sharing their insightful content and perspectives on the MPIA. He stated that Professor Yang, as one of the first and a reappointed MPIA arbitrator, provided highly valuable firsthand observations and theoretical analysis, while Professor Liu raised many insightful questions and viewpoints from academic and institutional operational perspectives. He looks forward to building more such dialogue platforms in the future!