On January 17, 2026, the “Grandwin Trade & Business Roundtable (Session XIII)” was successfully held, co-hosted by Beijing Grandwin Law Firm and the World Trade Organization Research Association of the China Law Society. Themed “A Retrospective on the First Anniversary of the Trump Trade War,” the salon was moderated by Guan Jian, an attorney at Beijing Grandwin Law Firm. The session featured a keynote presentation by Mr. Chen Zhikang, with commentary from Mr. Hong Xiaodong, a WTO expert and former Director-General of the Department of WTO Affairs at the Ministry of Commerce; Mr. Luo Zhenxing, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; and Professor Yang Guohua from Tsinghua University School of Law, followed by an open discussion.

I. Keynote: A Systematic Review and Analysis of Key Characteristics

Mr. Chen Zhikang provided a comprehensive overview of the trade policies and practices of the Trump administration during its first year in its second term. His core analysis is as follows:

On sanctions and tariffs, Chen noted that the motivations behind the current round of U.S. sanctions have expanded beyond traditional “national security” justifications, increasingly reflecting political considerations, as seen in the case of Venezuela. Regarding tariff policies, the U.S. has demonstrated a dual approach characterized by both “targeted easing” and “targeted pressure.” On one hand, it has reduced tariffs on certain agricultural products and imported goods that are difficult to substitute, responding to domestic inflation and supply chain realities. On the other hand, it has imposed harsh punitive tariffs of up to 40%-50% on goods from Brazil, as well as on steel and aluminum. Notably, the flexible use of the PTAAP list and the elimination of de minimis exemptions indicate a shift from “broad-brush” to “precision-targeted” policy measures.

Regarding the characteristics of agreement signings, Chen pointed out that the timing of agreements signed between the U.S. and other countries carries strategic significance. For instance, the Trade and Economic Prosperity Agreement signed with the UK on May 8 may have been intended as leverage in negotiations with China. The intensive signing of agreements with South Korea and the EU in late July closely followed the U.S. “last-minute tariff letter” sent to 14 countries. These actions reveal the U.S. strategy of using trade agreements as a tool of pressure, manipulating the pace of negotiations through tariff leverage.

On the core concerns addressed in trade agreements, Chen summarized several key issues prioritized by the U.S.:

1.Investment: The U.S. seeks investment commitments from various countries, such as $600 billion from the EU, $550 billion from Japan, and $1 trillion from Australia, with investments to be realized over 3 years, 5 years, or within Trump’s term (e.g., 3.5 years for South Korea).

2.Commodities: The U.S. aims to secure purchases of energy, aircraft, and other commodities. In areas like meat and cheese, it has demanded that certain countries permit the use of specific terminology.

3.Rare Earths and Critical Minerals: The U.S. seeks cooperation in mineral development, establishing high-standard markets and a price floor framework to ensure fair rules for U.S. mineral exports, thereby enhancing its competitiveness in rare earth investment and production.

4.Manufacturing: The U.S. is promoting “mutual recognition of U.S. standards” in three manufacturing sectors—automotive, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals—to facilitate exports of its manufactured goods.

Regarding Section 232, Chen mentioned two documents released by the U.S. Congress and the White House. One imposes Section 232 tariff measures on semiconductors, manufacturing equipment, and derivative products, currently imposing a 25% tariff on high-performance chips. The other targets critical processed minerals and derivative products. The new documents introduce a negotiation mechanism under Section 232: if the President’s negotiation measures fail to result in an agreement, other necessary actions may be taken to adjust imports and address the threat. From a textual standpoint, Chen suggested this could become a new tariff tool for Trump. However, historically, presidential measures have typically targeted specific products or categories; applying tariffs based on this new text would likely require judicial interpretation.

II. Commentary: Multi-Dimensional Observations and Projections

Hong Xiaodong commended the systematic and comprehensive nature of the keynote presentation and offered his analysis from the perspective of actual effects. Citing data from the IMF and U.S. think tanks, he noted that the global average applied tariff rate following the implementation of Trump’s tariffs was only between 9% and 12%, far below the initially touted 25%. This helps explain why global trade did not experience the anticipated “collapse” under Trump’s “reciprocal tariffs.” In contrast, the peak tariff pressure on Chinese exports to the U.S. reached 43%, and China’s share of U.S. imports fell from 22% in 2017 to approximately 9.4% in the first half of 2005 (likely a slip for 2025). Based on the magnitude of this decline, Hong suggested that the U.S. has partially achieved a decoupling of supply chains from China, though the desired effect of “manufacturing reshoring” remains limited. Hong argued that Trump’s tariff policies represent a long-term strategic shift, departing from the multilateral framework of the GATT/WTO and moving entirely toward bilateralism. Tariffs, he noted, have lost their traditional functions as revenue tools and instruments for protecting domestic industries, becoming instead tools for achieving geopolitical objectives, addressing illegal immigration, and combating drug trafficking—rendering them unpredictable and non-negotiable.

Associate Research Fellow Luo Zhenxing focused his analysis on strategic interactions. He suggested evaluating the effects of Trump’s trade war from three perspectives.

First, its impact on the U.S. economy currently presents both positive and negative aspects. As actual tariff rates remain below the optimal tariff rate (20%-60%), the impact on the U.S. has been largely favorable, given that most other countries have not retaliated.

Second, its medium- to long-term benefits depend on one’s view of the existing international order. If the order is seen as beneficial to the U.S., Trump’s approach is detrimental; conversely, if it is seen as disadvantageous, his approach may be favorable.

Third, regarding the outcomes of agreement signings, Luo assessed the Trump administration’s performance in the tariff war as a 70 out of 100. It has largely succeeded in securing bilateral agreements with major economies, addressing certain trade barriers, and attracting investment far exceeding expectations.

Luo noted that the effectiveness of the Trump administration’s tariff threat tactics is diminishing, with frequent use eroding their deterrent value. However, risks persist. He predicted that the administration’s strategy of expanding the concept of “national security” will continue, with Section 232 and Section 301 remaining key economic and trade risk areas to monitor in the first half of the year. The structural tensions between China and the U.S., he added, have not disappeared.

Professor Yang Guohua shared his insights from macro and rule-of-law perspectives. He suggested that assessing the past year of the China-U.S. trade war requires more time for observation and reflection, noting that he continues to view it as a “brawling, directionless” approach lacking clear objectives or careful planning. He criticized the U.S. government for repeatedly imposing tariffs without following statutory investigation procedures, which, in his view, undermines the rule of law. Yet he also observed that domestic legal mechanisms in the U.S., such as judicial proceedings, continue to exert a certain degree of constraint, creating a “framework amid chaos.”

Professor Yang suggested that after a year of probing and confrontation, the boundaries of acceptable actions are gradually becoming clearer. Combined with domestic political and economic pressures such as the midterm elections and inflation, he expects the situation this year to be somewhat “milder” than last year.

III. Discussion: Focus on Impacts and China’s Responses

During the open discussion, participants engaged in lively exchanges on policy impacts and concrete responses.

On trade compliance policies, Chen Zhikang argued that China’s establishment of trade compliance mechanisms is primarily aimed at improving its image within the WTO and international economic framework, rather than responding directly to Trump’s tariff measures. Guan Jian added that the revision of China’s trade laws codifies existing compliance practices, emphasizing that policy initiatives began as early as 2020, further weakening any connection to Trump. Hong Xiaodong noted that compliance work can be understood in both a narrow and a broad sense. In the narrow sense, it refers to compliance with WTO and FTA rules; in the broad sense, it includes compliance with local regulations of trading and investment partners. China’s trade policy compliance efforts, he noted, have long been underway and are not linked to Trump’s second-term tariff policies.

On supply chain diversification, Chen Zhikang noted that current U.S. measures have had limited impact, as tensions between China and the U.S. over critical minerals and investment have long existed, with no mandatory measures yet imposed to achieve investment outcomes. Hong Xiaodong observed that the U.S. is strongly committed to avoiding over-reliance on foreign sources for critical minerals and is gradually developing a strategic framework. However, fully resolving this dependency is unlikely in the short term; reducing external reliance is a medium- to long-term challenge. Meanwhile, China is also strengthening its resilience in semiconductors and critical equipment. The future trajectory of U.S.-China relations as both sides reduce mutual dependency, Hong suggested, warrants further study.

On geopolitical and agreement-related impacts, Chen Zhikang noted based on his corporate experience that geopolitical factors influence investment and industrial location decisions. For example, investments in mining tend to flow to Southeast Asia or Australia, while manufacturing investments follow the location decisions of upstream and downstream enterprises. Meanwhile, most current mineral agreements are soft law instruments lacking legal enforceability and do not currently pose clear challenges to WTO or international economic law. Hong Xiaodong analyzed the issue from the perspective of the WTO’s coverage and national security exceptions. He noted that if bilateral mineral agreements involve investment-related market access, they are not directly related to the WTO framework. While the WTO includes a national security exception clause, it cannot be abused.

IV. Summary

In his concluding remarks, Guan Jian provided a brief summary of the salon. The discussions centered on a review and analysis of Trump’s trade policies, including the characteristics of tariff measures, the impact of the trade war, and future trends. Persistent external pressures, he noted, continue to shape domestic industrial decision-making. For enterprises, diversifying supply chains and building robust compliance capabilities remain key to navigating uncertainty.